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Abstract: Equity markets play a pivotal role in the sustainability of developing countries, such as 
China. The literature on the detection of herding biases is confined to the aggregate level (firms, 
sector/industry and market). The present study adds to the behavioral finance literature by 
addressing the surprisingly unnoticed phenomena of the behavioral impact of herding bias on firm 
value (FV) at the firm level, using the sample of A-Shares listed firms at the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges (SSE and SZSE) under panel fixed effect specification. Initially, we detect the 
existence of investors and managers herding (IHR and MHR) biases at firm-level, and later, we 
examine their impact (distinct and interactive) upon the FV. The empirical results document the 
presence of IHR and MHR bias at market, sector and firm-level in both equity markets, which 
potentially drive the FV, while the impact is more pronounced during the extreme trading period. 
The findings are robust under different time intervals, and industry classification, therefore, offers 
useful policy implications to understand the behavioral dynamics of investors and managers. 
Keywords: investor herding bias; manager herding bias; firm value; Shanghai stock exchange; 
Shenzhen stock exchange 
 
1. Introduction 
The stock market trading dilemma is the cumulative reflections of investors’ behavior [1]. 
Investors exhibit behavioral irregularities (biases) which potentially influence market efficiency [2,3]. 
Among these biases, herding bias is the most prominent, which is associated with the trading 
behavior of financial markets’ participants [4,5]. It has become a subject of widespread interest in the 
recent decade [6–8]. Herding refers to the situation wherein rational people start behaving irrationally 
by imitating the judgments of others while making decisions [3]. Herding theories posit that market 
participants prefer to follow the financial experts in their trading patterns instead of their own source 
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of information [9].The study of [10] believes that the herding of investors is one of the major risk 
factors that is typically ignored by statistical approaches. 
In the past decade, the study of herding documents this diverse behavioral pattern across the 
globe. In the context of the U.S. markets, Christie and Huang [5] report the absence of herding bias, 
even during extreme market movements. Conversely, Choi and Sias [11] point out the presence of a 
strong institutional industry herding bias. Likewise, Wang and Zhang [12investigate the impact of 
individual investor trading on the firm value (FV) at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and find 
the positive impact of investor trading on FV. European evidence [13] illustrates the presence of 
herding bias in the “during crises” period. Also, Walter and Moritz Weber [14] identify the herding 
bias of mutual fund managers in Germany during extreme market movements. Chinese, Taiwanese 
and South Korean stock markets also reveal herding behavior [15–18]. In the Chinese equity market, 
Demirer and Kutan [19] empirically analyze the behavior of return dispersions during periods of 
unusually large upward and downward changes in the market index of both the SSE and SZSE, and 
conclude that the Chinese Market is free from herding bias, and a similar approach is used by Demirer 
et al. [20]. Conversely, Tan et al. [21] explore the evidence of herding bias at the SSE and the SZSE, 
the A-share and B-share markets. They also report the existence of herding bias in both rising and 
falling market conditions, specifically more pronounced in the A-shares of the Shanghai Market 
during rising market conditions. Bo et al. [22] witness the investment herding bias among the 
corporate board, directors, and CEOs of non-financial firms from 1999 to 2004, and the consequent 
positive and significant impact on the FV. Similarly, another group of studies [23–25] report the 
mixed results of herding bias at the SSE and SZSE. 
The above-mentioned studies highlight herding bias in two ways: First, the evidence of investors 
herding at market, industry/sector and firm-level during the extreme market conditions [17,19]; 
Second, the evidence of an investment-herding bias of the corporate manager [14] and their impact 
on the FV [22]. For the best of our knowledge, there is not a single study which explains the individual 
and interactive impact of investor and manager herding (IHR and MHR) biases on the FV. So, 
motivated by the recent studies [6,12,22] that manager and investor demonstrate herding bias in their 
investment decision, this study empirically investigates the following questions: 
1. Whether the investor herding bias exists at market-, sectors- and firm-level Chinese 
equity markets? 
2. Do managers of the firm also exhibit herding bias in Chinese equity markets? 
3. What is the individual and interactive impact of investors’ and managers’ herding 
bias on the FV? 
The Chinese Financial Equity Market is important to be analyzed as it has an influence on 
integrated markets [26], while in China there is a need to strengthen the financial resources for 
sustainable development and poverty reduction [27]. Based on the literature and the questions stated 
above, this study adds to the existing literature in the following ways: Firstly, it hypothesizes the 
presence of herding bias in the Chinese equity markets at the market and industry/sector level, in line 
with [8,15,19,28], and later it extends the phenomena at the firm level, which is a unique addition to 
the behavioral finance literature. Importantly, the market and sector level herding is insufficient to 
explain the investor's behavior associated to the firm, as Demirer and Zhang [17] find that the firm 
characteristics, their size and the past return has a significant effect on the herding behavior of the 
investor. Secondly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of 
IHR and MHR on the FV. Finally, another most interesting contribution is in the form of the 
interactive impact of both IHR and MHR on the FV, which provides insights into understanding how 
both stakeholders jointly influence the FV. 
Overall results demonstrate that: i) Herding behavior exists at market-, sector- and firm-level at 
the SSE and SZSE, and a non-linear and significant relationship exists between stock return and cross-
sectional absolute deviation (CSAD), which seems to be more pronounced in herding bias at all levels 
at the SZSE. The CSAD model explains 95% and 99% herding bias at the market level, 26% and 32% 
at sectors level, and 10% and 12% at the firm level at SSE and SZSE, respectively. While an absolute 
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investment deviation model detects 51% and 54% of managers herding bias at SSE and SZSE, 
respectively.  
The empirical results also suggest that IHR and MHR affect the FV significantly during the 
extreme trading period (2014 to 2015), at both stock exchanges, while the interaction of IHR and MHR 
reveals the same at the SZSE in 2013. Importantly, the results are robust under different time intervals 
and industry classification. 
The rest of this study is arranged as follows: Section 2 describes a brief literature and hypotheses 
development. Section 3 explains the methodological approach, including variable definitions, data 
sources and the sample period. Section 4 states the empirical results and discussion, while the final 
section concludes the study along with policy recommendations. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Prior literature finds a diverse herding bias among participants in various stock markets. 
Empirical evidence on U.S. and Europeans investors and managers exhibits the presence of herding 
bias among mutual fund managers [29], analysts recommendation [30] and pension fund managers 
[31]. The aggregate effect of herding behavior is more prevalent in international markets, especially 
in emerging markets. Chang et al. [15] find significant evidence of herding bias in Taiwan and South 
Korea, alimited bias in Japan, and no bias in the U.S. and Hong Kong. 
Later on, the Bueno [32] document herding bias in both theA-shares and B-shares of theChinese 
Stock Market. Furthermore, empirical analysis of herding on eighteen international markets by 
Chiang and Zheng [33] show the existence of herding in seven Asian and six advanced markets, 
whereas thenonexistence of herding behavior among both Latin American and U.S. markets, except 
during a crises period. Recent studies of Balcilar et al. [34] and Zheng et al. [35] also document herding 
behavior in the Gulf Arab and Asian markets. In Pakistan, the study of Javed et al. [36] and Javaira 
and Hassan [37]found no evidence of herding behavior in KSE 100 index companies at the Karachi 
Stock Exchange (KSE) for the period of 2002 to 2014. Whereas, the study of Yousaf et al. [38] on 
investor herding behavior in the Pakistan Stock Market during 2004 to 2014 reports the existence of 
herding behavior in the market, particularly in 2005 to 2008. Likewise, the empirical work of Shah et 
al. [28] for 2004 to 2013 also supports the significant evidence of herding behavior in this Pakistan 
Stock Market,specifically during the extreme market movements. Additionally, they found more 
than 50% of sectors at the PSX exhibit herding behavior during the upward market movements. 
Demirer and Kutan [19] examine the presence of herd formation in Chinese markets using both 
individual firm and sector level data. They analyze the behavior of return dispersions during periods 
of unusually large upward and downward changes in the market index. They also distinguish sample 
data between the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges at the sector-level. Their findings show 
that herding bias does not exist in Chinese markets. However, comparing return dispersions for 
upside and downside movements of the market, these return dispersions during extreme downside 
movements of the market are much lower than those for upside movements, indicating that stock 
returns behave more similarly during down markets. Munkh-Ulzii et al. [39] find the presence of 
significant herding behavior in Chinese and Taiwan stock markets. Tan et al. [21] explore herding 
behavior in dual-listed Chinese A-share and B-share stocks. They find evidence of herding within 
both the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets that are dominated by domestic individual 
investors, and also within both B-share markets, in which foreign institutional investors are the main 
participants. 
Herding occurs in both rising and falling market conditions. Herding behavior by A-share 
investors in the Shanghai Market is more pronounced under conditions of rising markets, high 
trading volumeand high volatility, while no asymmetry is apparent in the B-share market. Lee et al. 
[24] document the effect of institutional herding on future stock returns in the China A-share Market 
at both the market and industry level from 2003 to 2012. Using a unique institutional holding 
database, they test the herding effect at different time horizons. The results suggest that institutional 
herding has a significantly positive effect on future excess returns for A shares in the short, medium 
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and long periods of time. In the China A-share market, institutional herding is more significant on 
the buy-side than the sell-side due to short sell restrictions.  
At the industry level, manufacturing and construction sectors experience an institutional 
herding effect at all time horizons. The financial industry is found to present a significant institutional 
effect only in the long term. 
The institutional herding has a positive and significant impact on the medium-term and long-
term excess stock returns in the rest of ten sectors. Yao et al. [25] report the existence and prevalence 
of investor herding behavior in a segmented market setting, the Chinese A and B stock markets. The 
results indicate that investors exhibit different levels of herding behavior, in particular, herding 
strongly exists in the B-share markets. They also find that across markets, herding behavior is more 
prevalent at industry-level, is stronger for the largest and smallest stocks, and is stronger for growth 
stocks relative to value stocks. Herding behavior is also more pronounced under conditions of 
declining markets. Over the sample period which we are examining, herding behavior diminishes 
over time. The results provide some indication to the effectiveness of regulatory reforms in China 
aimed at improving information efficiency and market integration. 
Lao and Singh [23] investigated herding behavior in the Chinese and Indian stock markets. Their 
results support that although both the Indian and Chinese stock markets are considered inefficient 
with low information disclosure standards, the Chinese Market exhibits herding behavior greater 
than the herding behavior in the Indian Market. Nevertheless, in both markets, herding behavior 
finds itself stronger in large market movements. Asymmetry investigation discovered that the 
Chinese Stock Market has the most profound herding behavior when the market is low and trading 
volume is high. Instead, in the Indian Market, herding behavior is observed when the market is high. 
In the Indian Market, herding behavior also had no association with trading volume. The reasons for 
herd behavior existing in the Chinese Stock Market, in both up and down states, are analyst forecast, 
short-term investor horizon, and inclusion of risk in decision making [40]. 
Although herding mentioned in the above studies contributesmuch to a better understanding of 
investor behavior at the SSE and SZSE, their aggregate results are confined at market and sector 
level,which also explains the mixed results, existence and nonexistence, of herding bias over time. 
Thus, consistent with the prior literature, we postulate the first hypothesis to test whether herding 
bias exists at the SSE and the SZSE during the sample period 2008 to 2017. 
Hypothes (H1): Stock prices show significant herding behavior at the market and sector level 
Investors usually invest in those stocks with which they are familiar. Study of Huberman [41] 
considers the leading example of this phenomena. He explores the higher attention of employees in 
buying the security of those firms for which they work or are informed about from their peers. Ha 
[42] examined the impact of herding on the stock performance, and documentsthe very strong impact 
of herding on the stock returns and stock returns affect book to the market value of firms [43]. Also, 
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [44] found the investors trending in home stock are much higher 
than the foreign stocks, while careful policy actions are needed to prevent malpractices[45]. Gebka 
and Wohar [46] document stronger irrationality behavior among the investors particularly in the 
Consumer Services, Oil and Gas and Basic Materials industries in the international equity markets. 
Following these examples, it can be figured that investors mostly invest in familiar stocks and 
industries preferably in the national stock market. Focusing on individual stock information for a 
specific industry may help to explore the herd behavior better rather than at the aggregate industry 
or market level. To address the answer to this question, we postulate the second hypothesis as below: 
Hypothes (H2): Stock prices show significant herding behavior at the firm level in the Chinese 
stock market 
Detection of herding at any level is not enough to explain the behavior of investors toward the 
specific firm. Investors usually consider the FV while making their investment decision. The market 
value of stock reacts on the price momentum based upon the frequency of the investors’ trade. 
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Therefore, investors’ trading patterns show many behavior irregularities and biases which affect the 
firm's performance. Among these biases, herding bias is the main behavioral bias[4], which 
significantly affects the firm’s performance [6,8,22]. Wang and Zhang [12] elaborate on the positive 
impact of investor trading on the FV.  
Also, Hilliard and Zhang [47] find the weaker size and price to book value effect on the herding 
behavior of the Chinese Stock Market relative to U.S. markets over the period of 1999 to 2012. Our 
study differs uniquely from the prior studies, and tries to capture the impact of the herding bias of 
investors, at the individual firm, on the FV listed as A-share at the SSE and SZSE. To examine such a 
relationship, we construct the following hypothesis. 
Hypothes (H3): Ceteris paribus, IHR bias has a positive impact on the FV.H3: Ceteris paribus, 
IHR bias has a positive impact on the FV 
Effects of herding are not bounded to the investors only. Firms’ managers also exhibit herding 
behavior in their financial decisions. Theories on herding behavior in standard literature assume that 
the information set upon which corporate managers are making investment decisions is truly perfect, 
and informative under a mature market system that guarantees a transparent corporate reporting 
system, mature laws and regulations, strong shareholders’ protection and effective corporate 
governance mechanisms. Under such circumstances, the manager should make investment decisions 
based on the information set relevant to the firm. In contrast, Prendergast and Stole [48] discuss the 
herding intention of the managers who make investment decisions over time.Demirer and Zhang 
[17] find that small firms with a high level of herding significantly underperform from those small 
firms that experience low herding. They observe no significant interactions between book-to-market 
and market beta with herding. Chen and Demirer [8] point those industries that experience a high 
level of herding yield higher subsequent returns, regardless of their past performance. 
Theories on herding find firms’ managers usually follow their peers in investment decisions, 
instead of relying on their own source of information [9]. Garber [4] elaborates herding behavior as 
the most prominent bias in the psychology of judgment. In the recent past, the studies on manager 
investment herding behavior present the diverse behavioral pattern across the world. Fong et al. [49] 
demonstrate four general theories, classified into twoparts: Thefirst part belongs to intentional 
herding, and the second for unintentional herding. The authors state why managers may engage in 
herding behavior in their investment decisions as such: 1) Firm managers are subject to reputational 
risk when they behave differently from the crowd. Thus they may ignore private information to trade 
with the herd. 2) Managers may infer the private information of rival managers (perceived on their 
prior trades), resulting in the formation of informational cascades. 3) Managers may also receive 
similar private information because they also examine the same priced factors which caused them to 
arrive at similar conclusions regarding individual stocks. 4) Managers may exhibit similar aversions 
to stocks showing characteristics, such as low liquidity or low analyst coverage. 
In the U.S. and European markets, herding behavior among managers of different industries is 
different. Choi and Sias [11] document strong institutional herding in U.S. corporations. Also, Walter 
and Moritz Weber [14] pinpoint the herding behavior of mutual fund managers in Germany. 
TheSouth Korea, Taiwanand China markets also exhibit herding behavior [15,16]. Many scholars 
examine the relationship between managerial career concerns and herding. Devenow and Welch [50] 
analytically illustrate herd behavior in making corporate investment decisions. In light of the above 
literature, we postulate hypothesis 4: 
Hypothes (H4): MHR bias has a positive impact on FV 
Firm financial performance is considered the most important indicator for investors and 
managers for the evaluation of their financial decisions. It has broad implications for investments, 
capital allocation and market efficiency of the business. Alabass [6] and Bo et al. [22]demonstrate a 
positive and significant impact of MHR bias on the FV. Theprevious two hypotheses, H3 and H4, are 
constructed to test the IHR and MHR bias individually. Perhaps it might be more logical to test the 
Sustainability 2019, 11, 5583 6 of 21 
combined effect of herding bias to explore the magnitude of firm financial performance during the 
trading period. To investigate the combined effect of IHR and MHR bias on the FV, we test the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothes (H4): Interaction of the IHR and MHR has a positive influence on FV 
3. Methodological Approach 
3.1. Data Source and Study Period 
In this study, data are compiled from two data series of China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR). Firstly, we collect stock-based data, e.g., closing price, trading volume for 
individual stocks, sector/industry indices and market indices from stock market series during the 
sample period of 2008 through 2017. Secondly, we collect firm-level data, e.g., market to book value 
(MB), cash flow (CF), firm leverage (FL), firm growth (FG) and firm size (FS) from the annual audited 
financial statement. Initially, we consider all the firms listed with Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges (SSE and SZSE) during the stated period. Later the data constraint problem limits our 
sample to 664 and 379 from 41 and 67 sectors at the SSE and SZSE, respectively. 
These sub-sections initially describe the detection mechanisms of investors herding (IHR) and 
managers herding (MHR) biases market, sector and firm-level, and later explain the fixed effect 
specification used to examine the impact of IHR and MHR on firm value (FV). 
3.2. Investors Herding 
Since there is no direct measure of herding in financial markets, in financial literature different 
proxies are used to capture it indirectly at different time spans. Accordingly, the herding behavior 
can be summarized in two ways.[17] first employs the asymmetric trading orders of buying and 
selling the security in the market, which shows herding behavior on the buying side or the selling 
side, e.g., if the buyer orders are more than the selling order, then it is identified as herd in buying, 
otherwise herd in selling. This strand of the literature explains herding behavior at the investors level 
[31]. Whereas, the later detects the herding behavior using a regression approach based on an asset-
pricing model which links the cross-sectional deviation of security returns to the extreme movements 
of industry returns and market return. Usually, this approach captures herding behavior at the 
market/industry level. Mostly, the herding literature falls into the second approach (market and 
sector level), because in this way an appropriate sample of market participants can be analyzed at 
different time spans. This approach follows two common methodologies for herding bias. First is 
CSSD, and the second is Cross Sectional Absolute Deviation (CSAD). CSSD, initially proposed by 
Christie and Huang [5], calculates the cross-sectional deviation of stock returns as: 
CSSD୲ = ඨ
∑ ൫r୧,୲ − r୫,୲൯ଶ୬୧ୀଵ
n୲ − 1  
(1) 
Where n denotes the number of listed firms in the portfolio, ri,t is security i return at time t, and 
rm,t explains the equally-weighted returns of the portfolio at deviations. Christie and Huang [5] 
suggest that herding exists if the stock return dispersion by CSSD is significantly lower. Later on, 
Chang et al. [15]generalize the method for the herding behavior by adding the phenomena of CSAD, 
which is built on CAPM, for all market conditions. Our study is also based on the CSAD approach 
[15] for the detection of herd bias among the market participants, which is calculated as: 
CSAD୲ =
1
N ෍หR୧,୲ − R୫,୲ห
୒
୧ୀଵ
 (2) 
Chang et al. [15] suggest that there should be a linear correlation of CSAD with the absolute 
value of the security. However, when herd bias occurs, investor trades follow the same market 
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direction, and individual security returns tend to cluster around the overall market return. Thus, the 
linear relation turns to a nonlinear one.  
Under the following situation,thenegative and significant nonlinear relationship between CSAD 
and stock market return illustrates the presence of herding. Hence,theCSAD model for exploring 
herding behavior is constructed as follows: 
CSAD୫,୲ = α଴ + γଵหR୫,୲ห + γଶR୫,୲ଶ + ε୲ (3) 
Where negative and significant 𝛾2 shows the presence of herding bias. As our study also focuses 
on industry level and firm-level herding, we transform the above model, as below: 
CSAD୍୬ୢ,୲ =
1
N ෍หR୧,୲ − R୧୬ୢ,୲ห
୒
୧ୀଵ
 (4) 
CSAD୧୬ୢ,୲ = α଴ + γଵหR୧୬ୢ_୫,୲ห + γଶR୧୬ୢ_୫,୲ଶ + ε௧ (5) 
In Equation (4), the CSADind,t is calculated based on N, the wholenumber of firms' security 
returns within the industry. For the calculation of CSADind,t, we use the average industry return (Rind,t) 
for each of theindustry in the markets, along with the individual stock return (Ri,t) listed in the same 
industry.  
In Equation (5), Rind_m,t = Rind,t - E(Rind,t), where E(Rind,t) is the expected industry return which is 
based on CAPM, and calculated as E(Rind,t)= α + βRm,t. 
CSAD୤୧୰୫,୲ =
1
n ෍หR୧,୲ − R୧୬ୢ,୲ห
୬
୧
 (6) 
CSAD୤୧୰୫,୲ = α଴ + γଵหR୤୧୰୫_୧୬ୢ,୲ห + γଶR୤୧୰୫_୧୬ୢଶ + ε୲ (7) 
In Equation (6), we extend the model and calculate CSADfirm_ind,t of all firms’ security returns 
within the sectors, based on n numbers of observations. Moreover, in Equation (7), we replace return 
of firm in the industry at time t instead of the return of industry at time t in the Equation (5), where 
Rfirm_ind,t = Rfirm_ind,t - E(Rfirm_ind,t), as expected firm return in the sector based on E(Rfirm_ind,t)= α + βRind,t. 
We calculate stock returns of market, industry and firm as R =log(Pt/ Pt-1), where Pt denotes the recent 
price of stock and Pt-1 is the last price of the stock. For consideration of handling the outliers, we trim 
the return data at the 99th percentile. The specification of this model is consistent with [25]. On the 
basis of γ2 of the (CSADfirm_ind,t) model, we construct our index investor herding bias (IHR) of each 
firm from each sector and assign dummy values 1, if γ2 of (CSADfirm_ind,t) model is negative and 
significant and 0 otherwise. 
3.3. Managers Herding 
We use an absolute investment deviation ratio model as a proxy of MHR bias as suggested by 
Alabass [6] andBo et al. [22]. In the investment ratio model, herding exists if managers of firm i follow 
the investment decisions of their peers. In normal practice, it is impossible to consider that managers 
observe the contemporaneous investment decisions of other firms while making their own 
investment decisions. Perhapsit is more logical to presume that firms’ managers are aware of the 
average investment value of other firms, listed in the same industry, in recent years. Managers often 
consider the last year industry average investment value as a reference for their investment decisions, 
therefore, the proxy for investment herding is defined as: 
MHR୲ =  ቤቆ
I
K୧,୲ቇ  − ቆ
I
Kିన,୲ିଵ
തതതതതതതതቇቤ (8) 
Which is the absolute deviation of the investment ratios; the ratio of investment to the capital 
stock of firm i at the time t, and the average investment ratio of other firms in the same sectors, 
excluding firm i at time year (t-1). While computing the investment ratio (I/K)i,t, we first sort the data 
by sectors, followed by sorting within sectors for the measurement of the average investment ratio 
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(𝐼/𝐾തതതതത)−i,t−1 of other firms in the same sectors. Following Bo et al. [22] we also calculate net investment 
I, such as the net changes in fixed assets (FA) of the firm i.e., (I=∆FA) and capital stock at the beginning 
of the period, Ki,t by the total assets (TA) of a firm. A smaller investment deviation suggests herding, 
the managers of firm i make a similar investment decision to the other firms listed in the same 
industry. Therefore, based on a smaller investment deviation of the model as a proxy of manager 
herding, we construct a new index for MHR, and assign adummy value of 1 if herding exists, 
otherwise 0. 
3.4. Herding and Firm Value 
To examine the effect of IHR, MHR on FV, the theoretical association between these variables 
can functionally be expressed as: 
FV୲ = f൫IHR୲, MHR୲, CF୲, FL୲, FS୲,FG୲൯ (9) 
We transformed Equation (1) into mathematical expression: 
FV୲ = β଴ + βଵIHR୲ + βଶMHR୲ + βଷCF୲ + βସFL୲ + βହFS୲ + β଺FG୲ + γ + µ + ϵ (10) 
In the above Equation, FV୲  denotes FV as the dependent variable, and is measured by the 
market to book value (MB) [51–53,22]. IHR୲ and MHR୲  show investors and managers herding as 
independent variables, and this is measured by the methodologies of Chang et al. [15], and Bo et al. 
[22]. Whereas, CF୲ for cash flow to assets, FL୲ for firm leverage,FS୲for firm size and FG୲ are control 
variables as suggested by bothChen and Lin [54] and Bo et al. [22]. γ and µ are used for industry 
and years fixed effects, whereas ϵ explains the error terms of the model. Table 1 presents the detailed 
information of all variables. 
Table 1. Explanation of Variables. 
Variable 
Type Name Proxy Explanation 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ri
ab
le
 FV୲ MB Market value of assets/book value of assets 
Investor 
herding 
(IHR) 
Cross-sectional 
absolute deviation 
Market, sector and firm-level bias exists if 𝛾2 of CSAD 
has a significantly negative value. Dummy 1 is assigned 
when bias exists, otherwise it is 0 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
va
ri
ab
le
 
Manager 
herding 
(MHR) 
Investment to 
capital ratio 
Bias exists if an absolute deviation of investment ratio 
would be minimum. Dummy 1 is assigned when bias 
exists, otherwise 0 
Cash flow 
to assets 
(CF)t 
Cash flow at time t Cash flow to assets ratio 
Firm 
leverage 
(FL)t 
Firm leverage at 
time t 
Total debt to equity ratio 
C
on
tr
ol
 
va
ri
ab
le
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Firm size at time t Natural log of total assets 
Firm 
growth 
(FG)t 
Firm growth at 
time t 
Natural log of sales 
Source: Authors’ own research, 2019. 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Table 2 presents the descriptive analysis of the firm’s financial data at the SSE and SZSE for the 
period of 2008 to 2017, in terms of mean, minimum and maximum values, and standard deviation of 
the FV, Tobin’s Q—Ahmad et al. [55] and control variables such as cash flow (CF), firm leverage (FL), 
firm size (FS), and firm growth (FG). Column (1) and (6) report the mean values of FV, i.e., 1.88 and 
2.136 with the standard deviation of 1.92 and 1.94, and the minimum to maximum range, 0.188 to 
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11.967 and 0 to 0.49, at the SSE and SZSE, respectively. While the rest of the columns explain the 
description of the control variables, where FS has a relatively higher mean value with lower 
deviation, and CF has a relatively least average value with least deviation among the firms of two 
stock exchanges. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics at the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (SSE and SZSE) 
(2008–2017). 
 SSE SZSE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variable FV CF FL FS FG FV CF FL FS FG 
Mean 1.88 0.099 1.586 22.28 0.971 2.136 0.1 1.319 21.94 0.841 
Std.Dev. 1.926 0.099 1.776 1.365 0.645 1.949 0.1 1.492 1.269 0.594 
Min 0.188 0 −1.953 19.22 0.246 0.188 0 −1.953 19.22 0.246 
Max 11.967 0.49 10.845 25.88 2.203 11.967 0.49 10.85 25.88 2.203 
Obs 6640 6640 6640 6640 6640 3790 3790 3790 3790 3790 
Source: Authors’ own research, 2019. 
The pairwise correlation results of Table 3 haveno evidence of multicollinearityamong variables 
of SSE and SZSE for the period of 2008 to 2017..All variables are significantly related to each other, 
except the CF in SZSE, which has a positive and insignificant relation with FG. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix at SSE and SZSE (2008–2017). 
Variables 
SSE/SZE 
FV CF FL FS FG 
FV 1 0.131* −0.162* −0.490* −0.335* 
CF 0.050* 1 −0.138* −0.033* 0.004 
FL −0.130* −0.128* 1 0.191* 0.159* 
FS −0.528* −0.025* 0.145* 1 0.678* 
FG −0.392* 0.043* 0.138* 0.707* 1 
Note: * shows significance at the .05 level. The lower part of principal diagonal “1” explains correlation 
matrix for SSE and upper part present matrix for SZSE.Source: Authors’ own research, 2019. 
4.1. Herding at Equity Markets 
This section presents the empirical results of herding bias at a market level between two stock 
markets, i.e., the SSE and the SZSE by using the CSAD model [15,28].Therefore, a negative and 
significant γ2 (CSAD model coefficient) exhibits evidence of herding behavior. 
Table 4 exhibits the evidence of herding behavior by CSAD model in A-shares of SSE and SZSE 
during the sample period starting from 2008 to 2017. In Table 4, negative and significant γ2 with 
coefficients (−1.146) and (−1.741), and t-values (−2.08) and (−4.49), present the evidence of a herding 
bias in the SSE and SZSE, respectively, during the said sample period. Furthermore, this herding bias 
is seeming more prevalent in the A- Shares of SZSE, at a 99% level of confidence, which are consistent 
with the literature [16,19]. 
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Table 4. Level A-Share Herding Bias at SSE and SZSE (2008–2017). 
CSADm,t Α 𝛾1 𝛾2 Adjusted R2 
SSE  0.013*** 0.197*** −1.146** 0.037 
 (24.3) (4.94) (-2.08)  
SZSE 0.013*** 0.209*** −1.741*** 0.067 
 (27.74) (7.27) (-4.49)  
Source: Authors’ own research, 2019; Note: *,**,*** denote test statistics significant at 10%, 5%, and1% 
respectively, while t-value in parenthesis. 
4.2. IHR Bias at Industry/Sector Level 
Table 5 and Table 6 incorporate the evidence of industry/sector level herding bias by CSAD 
model (5) in the A-shares of the SSE and SZSE. The results in Table 5 indicate herding bias among 11 
sectors out of 41—these sectors are agriculture, food manufacturing, leather, fur, feathers and 
footwear production, petroleum processing, coking and nuclear fuel processing, metal products 
industry, housing construction, warehousing industry, other financial industry, health and 
comprehensive industry(γ2 is negative and significant). Table 6 attributes investors’ herding bias 
among 22 sectors out of 67 at the SZSE. These sectors include animal husbandry, forestry and fishery 
services, the agricultural and food processing industries, food manufacturing, the wood processing 
industry, culture and entertainment products manufacturing, the rubber and plastic products 
industry, non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry, instrumentation 
manufacturing, handling and transportation agency, internet and related services, ecological 
protection and environmental management, news and publishing, comprehensive, the wholesale 
industry, retail industry, air transport industry, catering, monetary financial services, the real estate 
industry, and media operations. While, 30/41 and 45/67 sectors at SSE and SZSE, respectively, are free 
from the herding, γ2 (CSADint,t  model, coefficient) is negative/positive and insignificant. Our findings 
are supported by prior literature [16,19,28]. 
Table 5. Industry Herding Bias at the SSE (2008–2017). 
Sectors Name Α t-stat 𝛾1 t-stat 𝛾2 t-stat Adjusted R2 
1 A01 0.010 *** (19.21) 0.346 *** (9.27) −2.649 *** (−5.49) 0.065 
2 A02 0.007 *** (21.76) 0.088 *** (7.99) −0.050 (−1.49) 0.055 
3 A03 0.008 *** (22.29) −0.125 *** (−7.65) 2.662 *** (20.98) 0.232 
4 A04 0.011 *** (29.95) −0.036 ** (−2.24) −2.273 *** (18.44) 0.244 
5 A05 0.009 *** (16.27) −0.015 (−0.60) 3.234 *** (20.85) 0.316 
6 B07 0.010 *** (21.21) 0.119 *** (3.95) 2.223 *** (6.23) 0.164 
7 B08 0.012 *** (19.94) 0.019 (0.51) 2.340 *** (5.26) 0.081 
8 B09 0.013 *** (44.92) 0.061 *** (4.71) 2.484 *** (62.95) 0.756 
9 B11 0.010 *** (22.72) 0.026 (1.46) 2.120 *** (26.37) 0.409 
10 C13 0.014 *** (25.88) −0.012 (-0.33) 2.808 *** (6.56) 0.096 
11 C14 0.013 *** (28.46) 0.128 *** (8.73) −0.067 *** (-6.36) 0.072 
12 C15 0.014 *** (58.48) 0.078 *** (7.86) 1.798 *** (77.08) 0.839 
13 C18 0.016 *** (49.71) −0.265 *** (−18.02) 6.179 *** (57.24) 0.636 
14 C19 0.006 *** (6.60) 0.415 *** (7.01) −4.284 *** (−6.56) 0.158 
15 C20 0.007 *** (5.48) 0.329 *** (3.44) −2.354 (−1.37) 0.216 
16 C21 0.011 *** (9.92) 0.033 (0.53) 6.484 *** (18.51) 0.835 
17 C22 0.013 *** (10.43) −0.144 (−1.19) 16.392 *** (6.88) 0.425 
18 C23 0.007 *** (7.91) 0.146 * (1.81) 0.752 (0.41) 0.197 
19 C24 0.008 *** (10.51) 0.463 *** (6.83) 5.617 *** (16.35) 0.933 
20 C25 −0.002 (-0.47) 1.138 *** (3.50) −12.514 *** (−3.01) 0.389 
21 C28 0.006 *** (6.75) 0.309 *** (3.08) 0.328 (0.12) 0.270 
22 C29 0.008 *** (9.11) −0.006 (−0.05) 24.212 *** (5.16) 0.412 
23 C32 0.009 *** (8.78) 0.293 *** (3.66) 1.232 (0.68) 0.306 
24 C33 0.007 *** (9.34) 0.101 (1.25) −6.916 *** (2.89) 0.349 
25 C38 0.006 *** (6.92) 0.201 ** (2.52) 2.854 (1.63) 0.370 
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26 C40 0.011 *** (13.11) 0.085 (1.22) 7.396 *** (4.02) 0.429 
27 E47 0.012 *** (7.46) −0.062 (−0.44) −10.440 *** (4.64) 0.311 
28 G53 0.008 *** (6.80) 0.198 (1.55) 3.351 (0.94) 0.177 
29 G58 0.006 *** (6.56) 0.350 *** (2.84) 4.851 (1.55) 0.293 
30 G59 0.005 *** (5.61) 0.140 (1.39) −5.289 ** (2.53) 0.292 
31 I63 0.100 ** (6.25) −1.182 (−1.73) 1.770 (0.25) 0.999 
32 I64 0.011 *** (7.28) −0.187 (−1.38) 9.974 *** (5.95) 0.406 
33 J66 0.008 *** (5.05) 0.336 *** (3.02) −1.149 (−0.76) 0.175 
34 J68 0.009 *** (7.55) 0.374 *** (3.95) −0.938 (−0.74) 0.217 
35 J69 0.003 *** (4.32) 0.310 *** (5.30) −3.294 *** (−4.54) 0.118 
36 M74 0.010 *** (8.93) −0.126 *** (−2.71) 3.313 *** (17.83) 0.779 
37 N77 0.006 *** (5.75) 0.139 ** (2.01) −0.364 (−0.35) 0.072 
38 Q83 0.009 *** (4.58) 0.487 *** (4.53) −5.222 *** (−4.11) 0.172 
39 R85 0.007 *** (5.03) 0.358 *** (3.51) −3.016 (−1.50) 0.174 
40 R86 0.009 *** (7.15) 0.073 (0.89) 0.153 (0.13) 0.062 
41 S90 0.007 *** (15.05) 0.406 *** (14.59) −3.765 *** (−11.00) 0.140 
Note: *,**,*** denote test statistics significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively, while p-value in parenthesis. 
Table 6. Industry Herding Bias at the SZSE (2008–2017). 
Sectors Codes α t-stat 𝛾1 t-stat 𝛾2 t-stat Adjusted R2 
1 A01 0.013 *** (21.15) −0.017 (−0.44) 3.557 *** (8.00) 0.120 
2 A02 0.013 *** (28.11) −0.169 *** (−7.39) 5.350 *** (26.80) 0.374 
3 A03 0.014 *** (24.27) −0.194 *** (−5.47) −6.004 *** (14.77) 0.194 
4 A03 0.015 *** (25.95) −0.165 *** (−5.66) 5.456 *** (23.82) 0.289 
5 A04 0.009 *** (19.35) 0.146 *** (7.11) −2.294 *** (22.28) 0.498 
6 A05 0.009 *** (20.66) 0.135 *** (4.75) 0.230 (0.65) 0.101 
7 B06 0.010 *** (17.58) 0.027 (1.17) 2.850 *** (27.75) 0.583 
8 B07 0.009 *** (19.74) 0.135 *** (5.14) 0.277 (0.92) 0.128 
9 B08 0.015 *** (41.11) −0.133 *** (−8.95) 3.841 *** (36.06) 0.442 
10 B09 0.010 *** (15.89) 0.290 *** (11.50) −1.766 *** (17.41) 0.483 
11 B11 0.013 *** (24.06) 0.265 *** (7.45) −2.010 *** (−4.28) 0.048 
12 C14 0.017 *** (38.17) −0.288 *** (−13.19) 7.423 *** (37.20) 0.456 
13 C15 0.014 *** (50.29) 0.085 *** (7.26) 1.605 *** (60.64) 0.772 
14 C17 0.016 *** (38.32) −0.241 *** (−9.64) 5.937 *** (18.97) 0.220 
15 C18 0.017 *** (36.88) −0.346 *** (−13.27) −8.768 *** (32.78) 0.393 
16 C19 0.010 *** (13.17) 0.132 *** (4.24) 2.445 *** (21.73) 0.479 
17 C20 0.008 *** (18.64) 0.240 *** (15.52) 0.580 *** (16.69) 0.400 
18 C21 0.015 *** (28.16) −0.267 *** (−9.97) 7.089 *** (31.99) 0.480 
19 C22 0.014 *** (37.79) 0.026 * (1.80) −2.708 *** (41.56) 0.562 
20 C23 0.009 *** (20.55) 0.242 *** (14.25) 0.872 *** (18.47) 0.401 
21 C24 0.012 *** (27.95) −0.025 (−1.49) 2.415 *** (28.15) 0.362 
22 C25 0.011 *** (23.42) 0.203 *** (6.53) −1.012 ** (−2.50) 0.079 
23 C26 0.012 *** (27.52) 0.228 *** (8.48) −1.950 *** (−5.50) 0.083 
24 C27 0.016 *** (57.70) −0.169 *** (−15.23) 4.517 *** (57.08) 0.648 
25 C28 0.013 *** (35.34) 0.035 *** (2.60) 1.768 *** (28.25) 0.404 
26 C29 0.016 *** (30.98) −0.201 *** (−6.22) −5.631 *** (13.92) 0.160 
27 C30 0.013 *** (26.21) 0.173 *** (5.33) −0.262 (−0.62) 0.074 
28 C31 0.012 *** (42.43) −0.054 *** (−4.68) 2.733 *** (48.69) 0.599 
29 C32 0.017 *** (37.33) −0.364 *** (−14.36) −6.702 *** (23.14) 0.231 
30 C33 0.016 *** (45.67) −0.229 *** (−14.99) 4.988 *** (37.94) 0.445 
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31 C34 0.015 *** (31.98) −0.048 * (−1.70) 2.687 *** (7.53) 0.101 
32 C35 0.013 *** (24.94) 0.238 *** (7.44) −1.675 *** (−3.93) 0.074 
33 C36 0.017 *** (43.78) −0.336 *** (−16.74) 6.796 *** (31.09) 0.353 
34 C37 0.013 *** (24.17) 0.145 *** (4.22) 0.892 ** (2.02) 0.098 
35 C38 0.016 *** (9.08) −0.065 (−0.78) 1.643 (1.34) 0.120 
36 C39 0.015 *** (9.63) −0.016 (−0.23) 0.795 (0.83) 0.093 
37 C40 0.005 *** (2.80) 0.385 *** (3.56) −3.662 *** (−2.88) 0.115 
38 C41 0.012 *** (8.48) −0.132 ** (−2.41) 3.585 *** (14.31) 0.734 
39 D44 0.009 *** (23.58) 0.277 *** (11.66) −1.954 *** (−6.31) 0.150 
40 D45 0.012 *** (27.78) −0.234 *** (−10.49) 5.519 *** (29.77) 0.380 
41 E47 0.011 *** (25.96) −0.086 *** (−4.64) −3.734 *** (29.33) 0.379 
42 E48 0.018 *** (41.11) −0.343 *** (−15.49) 7.722 *** (35.95) 0.420 
43 E50 0.011 *** (22.07) 0.059 *** (2.69) 3.498 *** (29.80) 0.511 
44 F51 0.011 *** (25.41) 0.172 *** (6.33) −0.717 ** (−2.02) 0.112 
45 F52 0.009 *** (22.78) 0.295 *** (10.41) −1.831 *** (−4.77) 0.145 
46 G54 0.012 *** (31.35) −0.210 *** (−9.14) 5.300 *** (20.95) 0.262 
47 G55 0.015 *** (32.84) −0.340 *** (−13.52) 7.214 *** (28.44) 0.329 
48 G56 0.003 *** (9.47) 0.402 *** (16.24) −3.627 *** (−11.78) 0.142 
49 G58 0.009 *** (20.42) 0.099 *** (5.15) 2.301 *** (27.36) 0.515 
50 G59 0.014 *** (26.77) −0.279 *** (−10.23) 8.040 *** (41.49) 0.702 
51 H61 0.009 *** (20.28) 0.122 *** (4.39) 0.056 (0.17) 0.117 
52 H62 0.009 *** (21.74) 0.038 ** (2.48) −1.786 *** (35.00) 0.533 
53 I63 0.017 *** (29.84) −0.160 *** (−5.32) 5.971 *** (20.80) 0.268 
54 I64 0.017 *** (27.86) −0.302 *** (−8.57) −8.097 *** (19.40) 0.277 
55 I65 0.016 *** (32.24) −0.159 *** (−5.34) 4.849 *** (13.62) 0.159 
56 J66 0.006 *** (14.54) 0.069 *** (3.78) −2.773 *** (25.33) 0.468 
57 J67 0.008 *** (17.71) 0.013 (0.44) 1.683 *** (4.85) 0.086 
58 K70 0.008 *** (22.90) 0.230 *** (12.03) −1.877 *** (−7.54) 0.231 
59 L72 0.012 *** (23.34) 0.195 *** (5.55) 0.220 (0.48) 0.093 
60 M73 0.009 *** (11.10) −0.031 (−0.86) 3.165 *** (17.90) 0.553 
61 M74 0.014 *** (27.28) −0.166 *** (−7.08) 5.986 *** (32.69) 0.458 
62 N77 0.007 *** (11.05) 0.370 *** (14.80) 0.428 *** (5.72) 0.332 
63 Q83 0.009 *** (16.25) 0.089 *** (4.55) 1.820 *** (32.97) 0.730 
64 R85 0.012 *** (19.27) −0.048 * (-1.96) 2.732 *** (24.70) 0.472 
65 R86 0.006 *** (7.92) 0.484 *** (19.38) −0.284 *** (−5.14) 0.279 
66 R87 0.006 *** (4.56) 0.165 *** (2.88) 1.690 *** (9.42) 0.803 
67 S90 0.008 *** (20.87) 0.036 ** (2.42) 2.183 *** (30.38) 0.456 
Note: *,**,*** denote test statistics significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively, while p-value in parenthesis. 
4.3. Firm-Level Herding Bias 
4.3.1. IHR bias 
Table 7 reports the dummies oftheIHR index among 667 and 379 traded firms of SSE and SZSE, 
respectively, and favors the hypothesis 2 [28,38,56]. The proportion of holding IHR, dummy 1, among 
traded firms varies with respect to time and more variation in IHR seems at SZSE, i.e., minimum 7% 
to maximum 13% during the sample periods. 
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Table 7. Investors Herding (IHR) index at the SSE and SZSE (2008–2017). 
Year SSE SZSE 
 Total of 664 A-shares Total of 379 A-shares 
 1 0 1 0 
2008 56 608 51 328 
2009 63 601 39 340 
2010 66 598 25 354 
2011 62 602 46 333 
2012 60 604 49 330 
2013 56 608 47 332 
2014 59 605 45 334 
2015 64 600 47 332 
2016 63 601 32 347 
2017 58 606 58 339 
Source: Authors’ own research, 2019. 
4.3.2. MHR Bias 
Table 8 demonstrates that the managers of A-shares listed firms at the SZSE appear more likely 
to follow their peers in their investment decisions. The average proportion of existence MHR, dummy 
1, is 34% and 35%, varies from 31% to 38% and 31% to 39% at the SSE and SZSE, respectively. 
Minimum ratio of holding MHR appears in 2008 and 2010, while the maximum evidence of MHR 
looks at 2016 and 2012 at the SSE and SZSE, respectively. Table 8 provides a snapshot of IHR and 
MHR indices among listed firms of the SSE and SZSE for the said sample period. 
Table 8. Managers herding (MHR) Index at the SSE and SZSE (2008–2017). 
Year (SSE) (SZSE) 
 Total of 664 A-shares Total of 379 A-shares 
 1 0 1 0 
2008 209 455 135 244 
2009 230 434 143 236 
2010 229 435 118 261 
2011 218 446 135 244 
2012 235 429 146 233 
2013 210 454 135 244 
2014 230 434 140 239 
2015 234 430 130 249 
2016 242 422 124 255 
2017 220 444 122 257 
Source: Authors’ own research, 2019. 
Bars in Figure 1 explain the increase, decrease and non-monotonic relation between IHR and 
MHR. At the SSE, both the IHR and MHR both increase in 2008, 2014 and 2015, decreases in 2011, 
2013 and 2017. Likewise, both the IHR and MHR at the SZSE both increase in 2008, 2011 2012, and 
decrease in 2010, 2013 and 2016, the rest of the years show a different trend between IHR and MHR. 
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Figure 1. IHR and MHR percentages associated with listed firms of 664-SSE and 379-SZSE. 
Source: Authors’ own research, 2019 
Figure 2 explains the versatile trading behavior of Chinese investors during the sample periods. 
In this figure, the period of 2013 to 2017 seems to be a highly volatile period of both of the markets 
where the trading index has divergent experiences. 
. 
Figure 2. Turnover of A-Shares at SSE and SZSE: Source; CEIC Data. 
Source: Authors’ own research, 2019 
4.4. Herding Bias and Firm Value 
Impact of IHR and MHR on FV is analyzed through multivariate regression with respect to 
hypotheses 3 to 5. In Tables 9 to 12, we use the market to book value as the proxy of FV, which is 
explained in Table 1.The Hausman test guides us to use the fixed effect regression analysis, which 
assumes a rejection of the random effect hypothesis under a significant p-value. Hence, we reject the 
null hypothesis, the random effect is appropriate. Using the following Equations (11–13), fixed-effect 
regression analysis with industries and time dummies reports result in Tables 9 to 12. 
FV୲ = β଴ + βଵIHR୲ + βଶCF୲ + βଷFS୲ + βସFL୲ + βହFG୲ + γ + µ + ϵ (11) 
FV୲ = β଴ + βଵMHR୲ + βଶCF୲ + βଷFS୲ + βସFL୲ + βହFG୲ + γ + µ + ϵ (12) 
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FV୲ = β଴ + βଵIHR୲ + βଶMHR୲ + βଷIHR୲ ∗ MHR୲ + βସCF୲ + βହFS୲ + β଺FL୲ + β଻FG୲ + γ + µ + ϵ (13) 
Table 9, a fixed effect regression model with year and industry dummies illustrates the impact 
of IHR, MHR and their interaction (IHR*MHR) on FV at the listed firms of the SSE and SZSE under 
the full sample period. The results support the third hypothesis in both of the markets, which implies 
that IHR positively drives the FV ceteris paribus. Whereas, the fourth and fifth hypotheses based on 
MHR hold true at the SZSE, where MHR and interaction demonstrate the positive impact on the FV. 
Overall findings document the influence of herding bias upon the FV, which gains support by prior 
literature [6,12,22]. However, the strength of relation exists insignificant during the sample period. 
To further diagnose the intensity of the said relation, we revisit the sample and select the extreme 
trading period of A-shares in line with the related literature [16,28], based upon the turnover of shares 
at the SSE and the SZSE. Table 10 presents the result of IHR, MHR and their interaction on the FV 
from 2013 to 2017, a highly divergent period, shown in Figure 2 of A-shares trading at the SSE and 
SZSE. 
Table 9. MHR, and firm value (FV) (2008–2017). 
 SSE SZSE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES MB MB MB MB MB MB 
IHR 0.033   0.072   
 (0.49)   (0.86)   
MHR  −0.063   0.032  
  (−1.52)   (0.57)  
IHR*MHR   −0.166   0.059 
   (−1.19)   (0.33) 
CF 0.459** 0.459** 0.463** 1.362*** 1.355*** 1.359*** 
 (2.26) (2.26) (2.28) (5.03) (5.01) (5.02) 
FL −0.030*** −0.030** −0.030** −0.036* −0.036* −0.037* 
 (−2.59) (−2.55) (−2.54) (−1.94) (−1.93) (−1.95) 
FG −0.035* −0.034* −0.034* 0.031 0.031 0.031 
 (−1.88) (−1.82) (−1.82) (1.16) (1.16) (1.15) 
FS −0.672*** −0.672*** −0.672*** −0.708*** −0.709*** −0.709*** 
 (−30.44) (−30.41) (−30.42) (−23.81) (−23.80) (−23.81) 
Constant 17.185*** 17.172*** 17.162*** 17.063*** 17.062*** 17.071*** 
 (42.83) (42.80) (42.76) (28.15) (28.14) (28.14) 
Observations 6640 6640 6640 3790 3790 3790 
R-squared 0.354 0.355 0.355 0.329 0.329 0.330 
Adj. R2 0.346 0.347 0.347 0.318 0.318 0.318 
F-Stat 43.91 43.95 42.92 29.05 29.04 28.15 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *,**,*** denote test statistics significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively,while the p-value is in 
parentheses. Where MB= FV measured market to book value of assets, IHR= investor herding, MHR= 
managers herding, CF= cash flow, FL= firm leverage, FG= firm growth, FS= firm size.Source: Authors’ 
own research, 2019. 
The results in Table 10 reveal that herding bias derives the FV at the SSE and SZSE. It explains 
that FV at the SSE is adversely affected by the MHR at the 5% level of significance with t-value (2.03). 
Whereas, at the SZSE, herding bias positively derives the FV, and this impact seems to be more 
profound by the IHR, i.e., 10% significance with a t-value (1.68). Further, CF significantly increases 
among those firms that are positively influenced by the interaction of IHR and MHR, while FG is 
positively and significantly caused by negative interaction of herding biases. On the other hand, FS 
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shows the negative and significant impact on the FV regardless of the magnitude of interaction. FL 
explains the positive impact on FV among the listed firms of both the markets. Results of control 
variables are consistent with prior literature [57,58]. The results support the third and fifth hypotheses 
of the study only at the SZSE, and contradict all hypotheses at the SSE. The reason for controverting 
findings from the prior literature, specifically at the SSE, might be due to the high and sharp shift in 
trading behavior from boom to slump. To capture the impact of this relation at a specific time interval, 
we divide the subsample into annual and bi-annual periods, based on a sharp, shifty, yearly edge 
turnover of A-shares. 
Table 10. MHR, and FV (2013–2017). 
 SSE SZSE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES MB MB MB MB MB MB 
IHR −0.028   0.127*   
 (−0.16)   (1.68)   
MHR  −0.218**   −0.059  
  (−2.03)   (−0.65)  
IHR*MHR   −0.196   0.136 
   (−0.53)   (0.46) 
CF 0.516 0.526 0.528 1.160*** 1.161*** 1.177*** 
 (0.98) (1.00) (1.01) (2.69) (2.69) (2.72) 
FL 0.042 0.045 0.045 0.028 0.028 0.027 
 (1.40) (1.48) (1.50) (0.92) (0.92) (0.91) 
FG 0.089* 0.092* 0.093* −0.023 −0.020 −0.022 
 (1.81) (1.88) (1.89) (−0.52) (−0.47) (−0.50) 
FS −0.965*** −0.963*** −0.964*** −0.712*** −0.710*** -0.711*** 
 (−16.68) (−16.66) (−16.66) (−15.12) (−15.04) (−15.06) 
Constant 20.731*** 20.664*** 20.655*** 18.233*** 18.158*** 18.210*** 
 (19.95) (19.89) (19.87) (19.14) (19.06) (19.08) 
Observations 3320 3320 3320 1895 1895 1895 
R-squared 0.200 0.201 0.201 0.323 0.323 0.323 
Adj. R2 0.181 0.182 0.181 0.302 0.301 0.301 
F-Stat 10.52 10.59 10.32 15.10 15.08 14.59 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: *,**,*** denote test statistics significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively, while their p-value is 
in parentheses. Where MB= FV measured market to book value of assets, IHR= investor herding, 
MHR= managers herding, CF= cash flow, FL= firm leverage, FG= firm growth, FS= firm size.Source: 
Authors’ own research, 2019. 
4.4.1. IHR, MHR, and FFP During Economic Shocks 
Table 11 reports the impact of IHR and MHR on FV during the economic shocks, as an exogenous 
factor, we divide the sub-sample into four intervals, i.e., 2013, 2014–2015, 2016, 2017, annually and bi-
annually based on the turnover trend shown inFigure 2. Among these four intervals, second interval, 
2014–2015, is bi-annual, as this period contains the versatile trading behavior, bottom-peak-bottom, 
of the index. Thefirst interval 2013 is in a less volatile period of A-shares at both the markets. During 
this year, IHR negatively influences the FV, while MHR positively influenced the FV at the SSE and 
SZSE, respectively. The interaction term explains the positive relation with FV, and this relation 
seems 10% significant at the SZSE. The second interval 2014–2015 shows the extreme trading behavior 
of A-shares at both the market where the SSE seems more volatile relative to the SZSE. Over this 
period, IHR exhibits a positive and significant effect on the FV, while MHR significantly and 
negatively influences the FV. Apparently, FV at SSE seems to be more sensitive towards the IHR, 
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whereas, at the SZSE, IHR and MHR both significantly drive the FV with a 90% level of confidence. 
The interaction term explains that in the extreme trading period, IHR and MHR negatively influenced 
the FV. 
The results in 2016, the immediate year after the highest and the lowest market index in 2015, 
capture the effects of the aftershocks. Market movement over this year quarterly moves up and down 
and explains the negative impact of IHR and MHR on the FV at both markets. The interaction term 
explains the mixed results at both the SSE and SZSE, respectively.  
The last interval (2017), is relatively low volatile, compared with second and third interval, 
which explains the negative and positive impact of IHR and its interaction term on FV at the SSE and 
SZSE, respectively. However, MHR clarifies a negative and positive impact on FV at the SSE and 
SZSE. 
Theoverall finding over the four intervals demonstrates that IHR and MHR strongly appears, 
and interactively negatively derives the FV during the extreme market movements. Whereas, in the 
low volatile period, the significance disappears, and the negative interactive effect on the FV at SSE 
continues as aftereffects. We also capture the impact of herding bias during the said sample in the 
group of industries listed at the SSE and SZSE. For this purpose, we rearrange our sample based on 
the group A-industry classification cited in the CSMAR database. Table 12 describes the results of 
industries and market wise relation of herding bias with FV. 
Table 11. IHR, MHRand FV during economic shocks. 
 2013 2014–2015 2016 2017 
 (1) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 SSE SSE SSE SZSE SSE SZSE SSE SZSE 
VARIABLES MB MB MB MB MB MB MB MB 
IHR −0.301 −0.233 0.360 *** 0.327 ** −0.159 −0.198 −0.097 0.344 
 (−1.30) (−0.90) (2.78) (2.41) (−0.70) (−0.68) (−0.44) (1.24) 
MHR 0.031 0.217 −0.143 * −0.201 ** −0.048 −0.074 0.142 0.269 
 (0.22) (1.21) (−1.73) (−2.26) (−0.34) (−0.42) (1.07) (1.46) 
IHR*MHR 0.240 0.921 * −0.135 −0.188 −0.124 0.003 −0.220 0.748 
 (0.47) (1.65) (−0.49) (−0.65) (−0.27) (0.00) (−0.41) (1.21) 
Observations 1707 1422 1707 1422 1707 1422 1707 1422 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ind. Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
t-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: Authors’ own research, 2019. 
4.4.2. Group A-Industry Classification 
Table 12 presents the relation of herding bias on the FV at the SSE and SZSE among six groups 
of industries (Group A-industry classification). Empirical results show that IHR positively and 
significantly derives the FV at the SZSE in the industry group. While MHR explains the negative and 
significant impact on the FV under the same industry head. However, the interaction term of IHR 
and MHR exhibits positive impact on FV at the SSE and SZSE, respectively. Likewise, MHR also has 
a positive significant effect on FV between the Business and Financial sector at the SZSE. The 
significant impact of MHR on FV at the SZSE is relatively more pronounced than the SSE. IHR and 
MHR among other sectors explain the mixed on the FV. 
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Table 12. Interactive impact of IHR and MHR on FV among Industry Group A. 
Groups  
SSE SZSE SSE SZSE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
IHR MHR IHR* 
MHR 
IHR MHR IHR* 
MHR 
Adj. 
R2 
F-Stat Adj. 
R2 
F-Stat 
Comprehensiv
e 
−0.276   −1.148   
0.388 17.98 0.615 16.67 
(−0.60)   (−1.59)   
 −0.145   −0.152  
0.387 17.93 0.594 15.32  (−0.44)   (−0.25)  
  −1.298   0.817 
0.386 13.04 0.600 11.49   (−1.18)   (0.40) 
Utilities 
−0.143   −0.704   
0.294 40.39 0.222 19.48 
(−0.49)   (−1.37)   
 0.158   −0.003  
0.295 40.58 0.212 18.99  (0.95)   (−0.01)  
  −0.597   −1.472 
0.293 29.11 0.218 16.95   (−0.98)   (−1.19) 
Business 
0.264   0.213   
0.391 47.06 0.008 12.06 
(1.24)   (0.43)   
 0.014   0.512*  
0.388 46.55 0.103 11.89  (0.11)   (1.95)  
  −0.352   0.781 
0.388 33.57 0.100 11.72   (−0.77)   (0.37) 
Financial 
−0.013   -1.008   
0.508 10.10 0.306 12.23 
(−0.02)   (-0.64)   
 0.828   1.594*  
0.538 11.22 0.479 13.56  (1.57)   (1.87)  
  −0.157   −0.170 
0.514 7.63 0.628 14.93   (−0.12)   (−0.43) 
Industry 
0.030   
0.297*
* 
  
0.258 
137.1
6 
0.260 
112.1
8 
(0.22)   (2.27)   
 −0.149
* 
  0.023  
0.260 
138.0
1 
0.258 
110.8
0  (−1.79)   (0.26)  
  0.128   0.228 
0.259 98.53 0.260 80.18   (0.45)   (0.80) 
Real estate 
0.051   −0.034   
0.331 35.53 0.321 16.59 
(0.23)   (−0.06)   
 −0.004   −0.125  
0.331 35.52 0.323 16.62  (−0.04)   (−0.33)  
  −0.517   1.899 
0.329 25.48 0.331 15.16   (−1.07)   (1.63) 
t-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Source: Authors’ own research, 2019. 
5. Conclusions 
The literature on herding biases is confined to detection at the aggregate firms, sector/industry, 
and market level. The study adds to the behavioral finance literature by addressing the surprisingly 
unnoticed phenomena of the behavioral impact of herding bias on FV at the firm level, using the 
sample of 1,043 A-Shares listed firms at the SSE and SZSE under fixed effect specification. Initially, 
we detect the existence of IHR and MHR biases at firm-level applying a CSAD model[15,35] and an 
investment model of firms’ investment absolute deviation approach [6,22]. After such detection, we 
deploy the panel fixed-effect model with industry and years dummies to investigate the effect of: 1) 
IHR on FV, 2) MHR on FV and 3) interaction of IHR, and MHR on the FV respectively. 
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The empirical results document the presence of IHR and MHR bias at market, sector and firm-
level in both equity markets, which potentially drive the FV, while the impact is more pronounced 
during the extreme trading period i.e., 2014 to 2015. The findings are robust under different time 
intervals and industry classification, and therefore, offers useful policy implications to understand 
the behavioral dynamics of investors and managers. 
Given the vital role of finance in economic sustainability, the study adds invaluable inputs for 
policy formulation [59,60], specifically, the findings appear to be important for potential investors, as 
the firm-level financial information is more relevant to their decision, rather relying on an index. 
Specifically, we infer that the negative interaction of IHR with MHR results in a bullish trend to the 
stock markets, while the bearish trend is explained by the positive interaction of IHR and MHR. The 
probability of a market crash may become higher in those circumstances when both negative IHR 
and MHR interact with each other and cause the FV to decline. Furthermore, this study infersthat at 
the SSE, if IHR and MHR shift from insignificance to positive significance, it might be the signal of a 
sudden boom in the market. Whereas, at the SZSE, this suggests that when a positive and significant 
impact of IHR disappears with the negative impact of MHR, this might be the reason for the sudden 
decline in trading activity, and vice versa. Thus, the study facilitates to understand the herding biases 
associated with the investment decisions of investors and managers and their impact on the FV that 
help corporate stakeholders, financial analysts and stock market regulators to devise their strategic 
and regulatory policies accordingly. 
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